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Summary. — To beneﬁt from a wide-spread public support for climate policy, aid agencies strive to show the climate relevance of their
development activities. Using project-level aid data and country-level political data for 21 DAC donors from 1995 to 2007, we test
whether this may lead to politically motivated misreporting. Through keyword search in individual project descriptions and complemen-
tary hand-coding we assess all aid activities for their actual climate change-related content, and thereby construct our most relevant con-
trol variables. Econometric results reveal that indeed, project coding is inﬂuenced systematically by the donor governments’ ideological
orientation as well as by national voters’ environmental preferences.
 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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“Never trust any statistics that you didn’t forge yourself.”
(Unknown source, albeit sometimes attributed to Winston Churchill;
for details see Frankford (2002))
1. INTRODUCTION
In order to assess the contribution of development aid to
the objectives of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment
and Development in Rio de Janeiro, in 1998, the OECD
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) introduced the
so called “Rio markers” for reporting aid projects related
to biodiversity, desertiﬁcation and climate change. In this
paper, we only consider the marker related to climate
change. Some individual donors have used such markers
since 1995.
The climate change-related objectives of the Rio Summit,
codiﬁed in the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), refer to the reduction or sequestration
of greenhouse gas emissions (“mitigation”). The correspond-
ing Rio marker should therefore indicate aid activities
related to the objective of climate change mitigation
(OECD-DAC, 2009a, p. 1). However, even at ﬁrst glance,
the list of aid activities reported as climate change-relevant
to the DAC reveals a number of curiosities. In the list, we
ﬁnd, for instance:
 Savannah elephant vocalization (US).
 Uniforms for park guardians in Central America (Spain).
 Tobacco control (New Zealand).
 Lead reduction in transport fuels in Pakistan (UK). 1
 Earthquake safety (Switzerland).
 Monetary climate in Democratic Republic of Congo
(Belgium).
 Love movie festival (Belgium).
Most of these obvious coding errors may be related to mis-
understandings (e.g., associations of any kind of environmen-
tal objectives with climate change) and some may be related to
rapid coding procedures. But some might also be related to
politico-economic factors, that is, to systematic over-coding
for political reasons. In any case, even at ﬁrst glance, there ap-
pear to be too many errors to be purely random.
A closer look at the data conﬁrms this initial impression.
There is, indeed, a considerable mismatch between the aid
activities coded as climate change-relevant by donors, and
those for which keyword search reveals an actual climate
change orientation. For a random sample of 115,000 aid pro-
jects, Roberts, Starr, Jones, and Abdel-Fattah (2008) ﬁnd evi-
dence for climate relevant content only for about 25% of the
projects coded as such with the Rio marker. Our own analysis
based on all 636,962 aid activities listed in the project level aid
(AidData) database for 21 bilateral DAC donors for the years
1995–2008 yields very similar results (see Section 2, Table 1b).
Can such strong discrepancies be purely coincidental, that
is, a random error by coding administrators when typing the
data into the system? In this paper, we test this hypothesis
against the alternative that at least some of the miscoding is
systematically related to variables such as the national voters’
environmental preferences, meteorological extreme events, or
the media coverage of international climate policy issues.
Drawing from the wider ﬁeld of public choice literature, we as-
sume that governments want to maximize political support.
Depending on the valuation of environmental policies by the
general public, this support may be positively inﬂuenced by
statistics showing a signiﬁcant climate change-related eﬀort
of development cooperation projects. At the same time, espe-
cially when transparency and the level of information are not
very high, these projects may not necessarily have anything to
do with climate change. The corresponding coding mismatch
may be reduced, however, if the government does not only va-
lue public support, but also intrinsically values environmental
objectives.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no literature on polit-
ically motivated project coding so far. There is, however, a
substantial amount of literature on politically motivated aid
allocation. Ever since the late 1970s, researchers have exam-
ined politico-economic determinants of aid allocation (for
early studies, see McKinley, 1978; McKinley & Little, 1979;
Maizels & Nissanke, 1984). 2 More recently, other aspects of
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aid, such as the relationship between multilateral donors’
policies and the interests of member governments (see e.g.,
Dreher, Sturm, & Vreeland, 2009a; Dreher, Sturm, &
Vreeland, 2009b; Kilby, 2009, or the use of speciﬁc procedures
and instruments of aid delivery, have also been assessed from a
politico-economic perspective. For an overview of various as-
pects of the recent literature on the political economy of aid,
see Lahiri and Michaelowa (2006). From a similar perspective,
other authors examine discrepancies between donor rhetoric
and actual policies (see e.g., Weaver, 2008 for an excellent
study on the World Bank) or incentive structures that result
in imprecise or biased reporting of project outcomes (Martens,
2002; Michaelowa & Bormann, 2006). This literature comes
closest to our study which intends to contribute to the political
economy of aid reporting, that is, to the assessment of political
factors that may lead to a misalignment between actual aid
allocation and aid allocation reported to the DAC.
The literature on the political economy of climate policy is
less comprehensive by far. The recent paper by Ba¨ttig and
Bernauer (2009) is closely related to our study in that the
authors also look at a “words-deeds” gaps in international cli-
mate policy. Their results suggest that democratic countries
experience larger gaps than nondemocratic ones. Our focus,
however, is on aid to developing countries, and on donors,
who are all democratic countries anyway. Only very few other
studies are explicitly related to developing countries. Flues,
Michaelowa, and Michaelowa (2010) discuss the inﬂuence of
institutional variables on decision making on the Executive
Board of the Clean Development Mechanism. And ﬁnally,
in the context of environmental aid ﬂows, Hicks, Parks,
Roberts, and Tierney (2008) use PLAID data to assess donors’
incentives to increase aid ﬂows beneﬁting the environment,
while reducing aid that has negative impacts on the
environment.
In our study, we speciﬁcally consider aid oﬃcially dedicated
to projects related to climate policy (“climate aid”) 3. The re-
cent availability of “project” level aid data 4 with individual
project descriptions provides us with the unique opportunity
to compare actual project content with the donors’ own cod-
ing of climate relevance. Our hand coding of project level
aid data provides the variables which are then fed into a
regression to test which parameters could inﬂuence donor gov-
ernments’ coding decisions. In Section 2, we ﬁrst present some
descriptive statistics about the problem of coding mismatch. In
this context, we also highlight some inconsistencies within the
deﬁnition of the Rio marker itself that may be responsible for
part of the problem. Moreover, we discuss our own keyword-
based recoding strategy.
In Section 3 we develop the conceptual framework of
our politico-economic analysis based on a political support
function model augmented by elements of government
ideological orientation. The econometric estimation strategy
and the operationalization of the relevant variables are
discussed in Section 4. Section 5 provides the empirical re-
sults, and Section 6 presents the conclusions of our analy-
sis.
2. CODING MISMATCH IN CLIMATE AID
According to the OECD-DAC’s deﬁnition of Rio markers,
agreed to in 1998,
“climate-change related aid is deﬁned as activities that contribute to the
objective of stabilization of greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic inter-
ference with the climate system by promoting eﬀorts to reduce or limit
GHG emissions or to enhance GHG sequestration.” (OECD-DAC,
2002a, p. 4).
Table 1. Donor coding versus authors’ recoding
DAC codinga Authors’ recoding
No climate relevance Unclearb Climate relevancec Total
(a) Overview
No climate marker 614,310 0 12,238 626,548
Climate marker 3,226 2,867 4,321 10,414
Total 617,536 2,867 16,559 636,962
No mitigation Mitigation related Total
(b) DAC Rio markers versus authors’ mitigation coding
No climate marker 623,294 3,254 626,548
Climate marker 7,616 2,798 10,414
Total 630,910 6,052 636,962
No adaptation Adaptation related Total
(c) DAC Rio markers versus authors’ adaptation coding
No climate marker 617,545 9,003 626,548
Climate marker 9,137 1,277 10,414
Total 626,682 10,280 636,962
a “DAC coding” refers to bilateral donors’ reporting to the DAC using the climate-related Rio marker.
b “Unclear” refers to cases in which project descriptions were insuﬃcient to assess climate relevance, that is, when the project description contained no
elements to determine either relevance or irrelevance for climate change. “Unclear” coding only appears in the context of positive DAC coding since in
cases in which project descriptions are missing or extremely uninformative, potential climate relevance is only revealed though the DAC coding itself. Such
projects would have been assumed to be climate irrelevant had they not received a Rio marker. Since unclear cases do not even allow us to reassess the
climate coding altogether, the more speciﬁc links to mitigation or adaptation cannot be established either. In this Table b and c, these cases are subsumed
in the categories “no mitigation” and “no adaptation”.
c If a project is coded “climate relevant” this usually implies that it will also be found in the categories “mitigation related” and/or “adaptation related”.
However, there are some cases in which the climate relevance was clear while the concrete project activities were not indicated. Therefore the sum of
projects we code “climate relevant” exceeds the sum of projects we were able to count as relevant for mitigation and adaptation.
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This deﬁnition can also be found in virtually all other cli-
mate-aid related DAC documents as well as on the OECD-
DAC homepage (see e.g., OECD-DAC, 1998, 2002b, p. 4,
2009a, p. 1, 2009b). As already mentioned above, it focuses
exclusively on climate change mitigation. The objective to ad-
just to climate change impacts (adaptation) is explicitly ex-
cluded from the deﬁnition due to the fact that mitigation,
rather than adaptation, is the ultimate objective of the
UNFCCC (see e.g., OECD-DAC, 2009a, p. 1). To cover adap-
tation, a diﬀerent marker was introduced in January 2010
(OECD-DAC, 2010), but has not been used for project coding
yet.
At ﬁrst sight, the DAC deﬁnition appears to be very clear
and well explained but the distinction between mitigation
and adaptation is less clear than it might appear. Directly un-
der the clearly mitigation oriented deﬁnition, OECD-DAC
(2009b, p. 1) speaks about adaptation when it comes to the
clariﬁcation of individual scores for the Rio marker. 5 While
this appears to be a simple typo, it may lend itself to some con-
fusion. Moreover, the DAC eligibility criteria for the Rio
marker include impact and vulnerability assessments (see
OECD-DAC, 2002b, p. 4), which are solely related to adapta-
tion. Another reason for confusion could be the two categories
used—the second having climate change mitigation as impor-
tant issue but not principal objective of the project.
Confusion about the correct deﬁnitions may lead to prob-
lems of unintended miscoding through lack of clarity, but
may also give rise to politically motivated over-coding through
the inclusion of adaptation related projects. Development spe-
cialists are usually not experts in climate policy, and the actual
use of the climate related Rio marker reveals that many pro-
jects were recorded as climate relevant due to their link to
adaptation, rather than mitigation (see Table 1a–c). This con-
fusion may also arise through the fact that mitigation aims at a
global public good that does not provide any speciﬁc advan-
tage for the developing country in which the activity takes
place, and is therefore not a typical aid activity. This is diﬀer-
ent for adaptation which gives a clear local beneﬁt to the reci-
pient country.
Table 1a shows that not even half of the 10,414 projects
coded as climate relevant by the donors (i.e., a total of 4,321
projects) clearly contribute to either mitigation or adaptation
of climate change. For another 2,867 projects, descriptions
are so limited that their contribution is not clear. And for
about one third of the projects (3,226 projects in total), the
bilateral donors’ coding is clearly inappropriate, that is, pro-
jects were coded as climate change-relevant while they are
not (not even when including adaptation along with mitiga-
tion). At the same time, we observe a high number of cases
(12,238) where we ﬁnd a contribution to climate change miti-
gation but where bilateral donors did not use the Rio marker.
Of course, the large majority of projects show no climate rel-
evance—from neither the authors’, nor the donors’ coding.
This lies in the nature of development assistance where cli-
mate-related objectives are certainly not the top-priority and
have only recently become more prominent. These clearly
nonclimate relevant projects are not of much interest for our
current analysis of over-coding.
Looking more closely at Table 1b, we see that if the Rio
marker were taken seriously as a code only for mitigation re-
lated projects, evidence of over-coding would be even stronger.
In fact, the numbers reveal that only about one fourth of all
projects with Rio marker are actually relevant for mitigation
(2,798 out of 10,414). The remaining three quarters would
be over-coded. If we add projects relevant for adaptation
(1,277, see Table 1c), the share of over-coded projects is
reduced to below 60%. Obviously, this share is still extremely
high. Thus, even if we assume that all adaptation related over-
coding is solely due to lack of knowledge or insuﬃciently clear
coding directives, we still have a very high share of over-cod-
ing to explain by other factors.
Let us now look at those projects which were not reported as
climate relevant to the DAC, but still are related to either mit-
igation or adaptation. Table 1b reveals that more than half of
the actually mitigation relevant projects since 1995 have not
been coded as such. This might, for example, be due to the fact
that “normal” hydropower projects are not seen as climate
change mitigation despite providing renewable, carbon-free
electricity. Similarly, many rural development projects have
a mitigation component such as agroforestry. For adaptation
the share of relevant but unrecorded projects is still much
higher, at almost 90% (Table 1c). This probably reﬂects that
after all, to some extent, project administrators have realized
that the focus of the Rio-coding is mitigation rather than
adaptation.
The quality of climate related reporting varies substantially
among donor countries. Over-coding is particularly prevalent
in the United States, Netherlands and Norway, followed by
Portugal, Germany, Denmark, and Austria. In all of these
countries, over-coding concerns between 5% and 46% of the
projects labeled either climate relevant or nonrelevant by the
donors themselves. This is substantial considering that
the majority of these projects is clearly climate-irrelevant given
the nature of aid (for details on all donors, see Appendix B).
Obviously, whatever discrepancies and inconsistencies we
ﬁnd in the data may be, in principle, related as much to mis-
takes in our own recoding, as to mistakes in the original cod-
ing reported by DAC donors. Such errors may arise, in
particular, because we had to assess a huge number of projects
within very limited time. Since, for the sake of our politico-
economic analysis, we require information on all projects,
we were not able to use an in-depth study of a sub-sample
of projects such as Roberts et al. (2008). We were also unable
to follow the method of machine based recoding suggested by
Roberts, Weissberger, and Peratsakes (2010). They use a spe-
ciﬁc algorithm allowing a computer to code of the full dataset
on the basis of the experience gathered in the initially drawn
random sample. Unfortunately, their recoded data have not
been available in time for our analysis.
However, given our familiarity with climate related aid pro-
jects, and the safeguards we set up through a double-check of
all mismatches, we believe that our own coding eﬀorts can be
considered as suﬃciently reliable in the context of this study.
We had the opportunity to cross-check our keywords with
those used by Roberts et al. (2008), in order to ensure the
inclusion of all important categories. In addition, our own
coding tries to avoid the ambiguity of some coding categories
(such as “cleaner production” and “air pollution enforce-
ment”). 6
Many speciﬁc examples of miscoding are provided along
with a detailed description of our coding procedure in Appen-
dix A of this paper. Appendix A also includes a discussion of
certain problems faced during the coding process. Our recoded
variables are available in a separate data Appendix D.
3. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICALLY
MOTIVATED CODING DECISIONS
Let us now return to the question whether the strong dis-
crepancies between climate coding by bilateral donors and
our recoding based on individual project descriptions can be
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purely coincidental. To some extent, they certainly reﬂect a
lack of expertise with respect to climate policy or unclear
information about the new marker. They may also reﬂect a
lack of diligence driven by time and resource constraints, or
even a lack of knowledge about the project itself—if some
head oﬃce administrative staﬀ rather than the project man-
ager assigns these codes (Roberts et al., 2010, p. 3). These rea-
sons for coding mismatch would simply lead to a random
error of donor coding.
The mismatch is, however, so substantial that this may be
only part of the story. Climate policy has become such a prom-
inent part of international and national policy debates that it
could be relevant for electoral decisions. Aid agencies seem to
be well aware of the public relevance of climate policy. Anec-
dotal evidence suggests that high-level staﬀ in aid agencies
consider moving toward climate related topics in order to
escape from a general aid fatigue (see also Michaelowa &
Michaelowa, 2011). Hicks et al. (2008, p. 160) speak of a
“political market for environmental aid in wealthy countries”
and argue that “this market is shaped by the preferences of
voters within each country.” Despite a dominance of dis-
courses about issues such as unemployment, taxes, migration,
or trade openness in national election campaigns, evidence
shows that at least those political and administrative oﬃcials
directly responsible for development cooperation care tremen-
dously about their public image, notably before the elections.
How else to explain why, in the mid-1990s, the French DAC
delegation went up to the level of the OECD Secretary Gen-
eral to push through a couple of changes in the wording of
the DAC Peer Review on the performance of French develop-
ment aid. Or the German DAC delegation responding to a
50-page draft of the DAC Peer Review by a 70-page fax with
requests for “factual changes” brieﬂy before the 1998 general
elections? A number of academic studies also suggest the
relevance of voters’ aid and/or environmental preferences for
government policy (see e.g., List & Sturm, 2006; Milner &
Tingley, 2010).
At times, rhetorical changes (or changes in coding), rather
than changes in substance may be suﬃcient to ensure public
support. This should be particularly true for policy areas as
diﬃcult to verify as climate aid.
More formally, let us assume a government’s utility depends
on public support, on the one hand, and on some ideological
preferences on the other hand. In line with most of the litera-
ture on the political economy of environmental policy making,
we do not distinguish between the administrative side and the
political side of government (see e.g., Blanke, 2002; Felder &
Schleiniger, 2002; Hicks et al., 2008; List & Sturm, 2006). To
simplify the exposition, we rather imagine an aid administra-
tion headed by the relevant minister for development cooper-
ation (reﬂecting the political side of the aid administration) as
a single agent.
Public support is increased through greater evidence for the
government’s climate change-related activities, especially if
environmental objectives are considered important by the
country’s population (see e.g., Hicks et al., 2008). In our con-
text, this implies that aid statistics showing strong evidence of
climate change-related activities will increase public support
by an environmentally concerned population in the donor
country.
We now consider that this evidence can be generated by
either actually increasing climate related activities, or by forg-
ing the statistics through over-coding. The former has the dis-
advantage that subject to a given budget constraint, any
additional climate project will lead to the reduction of activi-
ties elsewhere. Over-coding, however, can provide the impres-
sion of enhanced climate activities without the need to reduce
other activities. It will therefore increase government utility.
Unfortunately, this does not lead us to a clear prediction
with respect to the impact of the public’s valuation of environ-
mental issues. While the literature clearly suggests that the
public’s ecological preferences are positively correlated with
actual environmental policy making (List & Sturm, 2006;
Knill, Debus, & Heichel, 2010), this is less obvious for over-
coding. For instance, voters with environmental preferences
may not only value climate related aid, but may also be more
critical observers of the government’s environmental policies,
so that over-coding becomes a risky business. While the sign
of the relationship can thus not be unambiguously determined
on theoretical grounds, our hunch is that the incentive for
over-coding will dominate, because actual detection of
wrongly reported aid statistics has been an extremely diﬃcult
task so far (given the low level of publicly available informa-
tion on the details of individual aid activities and the high
transaction cost involved in such an analysis). This leads us
to our ﬁrst hypothesis:
H1. Over-coding will be the stronger the more the national
population in the donor country values environmental objec-
tives.
Nevertheless, we consider that change in transparency may
play a role with respect to the public’s critical scrutiny (typi-
cally led by NGOs). While there has not been much change
over time concerning the transparency of aid activities, infor-
mation on climate change-related issues has varied over time
along with diﬀerent levels of media coverage. A high level of
information may render the obfuscation of over-coding more
diﬃcult and thereby increase the risk of discovery. This leads
us to our second hypothesis:
H2. Over-coding will be the stronger, the less the national
population in the donor country is informed about climate
policy issues.
Finally, we assume that the government also has ideological
preferences, whereby “ideological” refers to an intrinsic valu-
ation of certain objectives, unrelated to voter preferences
and exogenously determined, that is, not explained within
our model. This is a typical assumption in models of environ-
mental policy making (see Knill et al., 2010). The consider-
ation of ideology alters the government’s optimization
problem and complements the purely opportunistic perspec-
tive of a simple political support function model. If a govern-
ment has ecological preferences, an increase of actual climate
change-related activities will lead to higher utility even if other
activities equally valued by the public will have to be reduced.
This implies that at a given level of transparency and public
support of environmental issues, a government with ecological
preferences will generate more truly climate relevant activities.
As long as reporting incentives remain unchanged, this should
reduce the gap between actual and reported climate related aid
activities, and thereby lead to less over-coding. This leads us to
our ﬁnal hypothesis:
H3. The prevalence of over-coding is reduced if the govern-
ment has ecological preferences.
However, is it not conceivable that reporting incentives in-
crease, too? It certainly would if we relaxed our simplifying
assumption of considering the administrative and the political
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part of the government as a single, unitary actor. One could
then, alternatively, imagine a principal–agent framework with
the administration being the government’s agent for the imple-
mentation of development aid. In this case, a change in gov-
ernment ideology toward environmental preferences could
lead to an additional incentive for the aid administration to
over-report climate related projects. The principal–agent
framework would thus lead to very diﬀerent predictions for
the relationship between government ideology and over-cod-
ing. As we cannot draw on any prior studies to clarify this the-
oretical argument, we will have to rely on the results of our
econometric analysis to see whether our simpliﬁed model, or
rather a more complex theoretical framework (including a
principal–agent relationship between the government and the
aid administration), is more appropriate to describe the empir-
ical evidence.
4. OPERATIONALIZATION AND ECONOMETRIC
ESTIMATION STRATEGY
We can test the three hypotheses using the project-level aid
data provided by AidData (Tierney et al., 2011) in combina-
tion with political, economic, and environmental data from
other sources. As we want to explain the donors’ coding deci-
sion, the dependent variable is based on the Rio marker re-
ported to the DAC. We generate a dummy variable “Rio
dummy” that takes the value 1 if a donor reports that his/
her project is climate change-relevant (i.e., with mitigation as
the principal objective or among the important objectives),
and 0 otherwise. For some donors we cannot clearly distin-
guish between those projects which they assessed as climate
change-irrelevant and those projects which they did not assess
at all (in particular for the United States which did not use
zero-codes at all). Therefore, all of these will be coded as 0
in our Rio dummy. 7
As an alternative dependent variable, we will directly use
our dummy for “over-coding” taking the value of 1 if we ﬁnd
clear evidence that the project has no link to either mitigation
or adaptation activities while the Rio dummy is still reported
as 1. Unclear cases are coded as 0 rather than 1, that is, they
are considered as correct.
We use diﬀerent variables to measure the environmental
preferences of the population (as necessary to test Hypothesis
1). First, we explore the World Values Survey (WVS) which
provides us with the percentage of the population in each do-
nor country considering global warming or the greenhouse ef-
fect as a very serious problem (World Values Survey
Association., 2009). Unfortunately, the information is only
available for a single year (2005). Nevertheless, assuming
that—at least relative to other countries—these preferences
stay relatively stable over time, we can use these ﬁgures as a
general estimate of cross-country diﬀerences in the popula-
tion’s valuation of global environmental problems, and even
more speciﬁcally, the problem of climate change. For some
countries, for which data on this question were not available,
we used information from other questions related to the envi-
ronment from the 2005 and earlier WVS surveys to impute the
missing values. Only for one donor (Greece) no imputations
were possible because it did not participate in any of these sur-
veys.
Second, we assume that environmental preferences of the
population should ﬁnd their reﬂection in votes for green
parties, so that we can use the share of green seats in national
parliaments as a second indicator of the relevance of environ-
mental objectives in the population. These data are
available from Armingeon, Potolidis, Gerber, and Leimgruber
(2008).
Third, we consider the rate of unemployment as an indicator
of the relative salience of environmental problems. Our expec-
tation is that in periods of high unemployment, people will be
less concerned with environmental issues. As business cycles
do not necessarily move in line with electoral cycles, this var-
iable might capture some of the variation in preferences which
is not covered by the more direct measure of preferences re-
ﬂected in electoral outcomes. Data on unemployment are
available from the World Bank’s (2009a) World Development
Indicators (WDI).
Let us now turn to the variables required to test our other
hypotheses. The information of the population about climate
policy issues (as required for Hypothesis 2) is measured by a
count of press articles referring to climate change in their ab-
stract or introductory paragraph. As we cannot assess the
press in all national languages, we consider only one relatively
widely read international newspaper, the “New York Times”. 8
While this does not allow us to explore cross-country variation
in the level of information, it should capture variation over
time at the global level. The data on this variable were ob-
tained through keyword search in LexisNexis. (2010).
Regarding the preferences of the government (Hypothesis 3)
we consider several variables. First, we assume that green or,
more generally, left governments tend to have environmental
preferences. As environmental preferences are only imprecisely
reﬂected on a left–right dimension (Knill et al., 2010, p. 304),
the ideal indicator would more closely reﬂect party positions
(e.g., the indicator based on the assessment of party manifes-
tos by Cusack and Engelhardt (2002)). However, these data
are not available for most of the time period relevant for the
Rio coding. We thus do not see any alternative to the measure
of the traditional left–right dimension. In this context, we use
the index of cabinet composition developed by Schmidt (1992)
and updated by Armingeon et al. (2008). The index takes on
values from 1 (hegemony of right-wing and center parties),
to 5 (hegemony of social-democratic and other left parties).
Second, we suppose that the relative Kyoto gap, that is, the
diﬀerence between the national emission target adopted in the
framework of the Kyoto Protocol and current emission levels,
divided by the base year emissions level, could provide further
information on government preferences. If the government is
itself responsible for the emission reduction target, a stringent
target (and thus a high initial relative gap) is a direct reﬂection
of the government’s position on this topic. In other words, the
stronger the government’s environmental preferences, the
more stringent should be the Kyoto target. For later govern-
ments who inherit the target, the remaining gap is proportion-
ate to the necessity of action. If the target is eventually not
met, the government will lose credibility at the international le-
vel. Thus even if the “green” beliefs are not fully authentic, the
fears to lose face internationally may increase the preferences
for concrete environmental policy action. Data on the Kyoto
gap are available from IGES. (2009).
Third, we conjecture that extreme meteorological events
with severe consequences in any particular donor country
(such as ﬂooding, storms, heat waves or droughts) will inﬂu-
ence the government’s perceptions about the general need
for climate policies. Of course, such events also inﬂuence the
preferences of the population as a whole. However, it is the ef-
fect on the government’s own preferences which distinguishes
this variable from other variables such as unemployment. It is
through the eﬀect on government preferences that we expect a
reduction rather than an increase in over-coding. We extract
data on extreme events from publications by the World
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Meteorological Organization (WMO, various years) and con-
struct a corresponding dummy variable.
Finally, we will consider a certain number of controls. Most
importantly, whenwe use theRio dummy as our dependent var-
iable, we need to control for actual mitigation and adaptation.
This control (which is possible only on the basis of the transpar-
ency on project level aid provided by the new AidData data) is
central for our analysis. Without this control, the potential rel-
evance of political-economic variables might well refer to actual
climate aid; but with this control, it only refers to variations in
reporting, at given levels of actual climate aid. In our recoding
procedure described in Section 2 and Appendix A, we generate
two separate dummy variables indicating a project’s relevance
for either mitigation or adaptation. It is worthwhile to distin-
guish between both because of the Rio marker’s oﬃcial focus
on mitigation only. Controlling for mitigation and adaptation
separately, we will be able to make out to what extent this has
been incorrectly interpreted to include adaptation.
In addition, we control for income and economic growth in
donor countries. The underlying idea is that these factors may
inﬂuence the government budget constraints when considering
climate related interventions. While the general level of income
(GDP per capita) aﬀects the overall level of resources and
therefore shapes government spending in the long-run, tempo-
rary relaxation of the budget constraint is determined by eco-
nomic growth. We thus expect that with a higher level of
income and in periods of high growth there is less need to
use over-coding since ﬁnance for truly climate related mea-
sures is more easily available.
As yet another macroeconomic variable, we consider the
share of agricultural value added in donor GDP. In developed
countries, a strong agricultural sector usually goes hand in
hand with important lobbying activities. As national policies
against climate change often have a negative impact on imme-
diate earning prospects in agriculture due to increase of energy
costs, these lobbying activities tend to be directed against such
interventions or against the mere perception of a need for ac-
tion. In no industrialized country relevant mitigation policies
have been introduced in the agricultural sector, whereas in a
signiﬁcant share of OECD countries the politically powerful
heavy industry lobby was unable to prevent introduction of
emissions trading systems or carbon taxes. In New Zealand,
for instance, in 2003 the agricultural lobby immediately led
politicians to shelve a proposal for a tax on livestock methane
emissions (Fickling, 2003). Such lobby interventions may
override the preferences of the government and/or the prefer-
ences of the population as a whole. These additional variables
are available from the WDI database. (Missing values for all
our macroeconomic variables are imputed using linear impu-
tation based on related variables from the same dataset.)
Apart from macroeconomic variables, we consider a few
additional controls which may be relevant to avoid omitted
variable bias in our regressions. First, we consider that the
age composition of the population in donor countries may
interfere with voters’ climate policy-related preferences and
therefore be relevant in the context of the variables used to as-
sess Hypothesis 1. The neglect of climate change today is
equivalent to living on the future generations’ resources. A
younger population may have stronger preferences for envi-
ronmental policies if it feels more directly concerned by its
consequences than older people. If, however, the detrimental
eﬀect of today’s neglect of climate change is expected to be rel-
evant only further in the future, it might also be that older
people care more. In their empirical assessment, Torgler, Vali-
nas, and Macintyre (2008) ﬁnd that older people tend to
express less support for general environmental policies, but
show even more active engagement for environmental objec-
tives. Since the relationship between age and environmental
preference is not clear, we cannot use this variable to test
Hypothesis 1. This is why we simply add this variable as a con-
trol. To capture the impact of age, we include the share of the
population aged 65 and over which is available from the
OECD (2008).
Another relevant control may be project size. On the one
hand, any government wishing to impress its population by
a high share of climate change-relevant aid will be able to
do so more easily with ﬁnancially large projects. After all,
ﬁnancial ﬂows rather than project numbers are usually pre-
sented in published statistics. This implies that, for political
reasons, large projects may tend to be over-coded more fre-
quently. At the same time, the project description for big pro-
jects could simply be less detailed, so that even if climate policy
is indeed among the important objectives, this may not always
have been recognizable for our recoding. In this case, a posi-
tive relationship between project size and over-coding may
simply be an artifact of imprecise reporting. Unfortunately,
there is no way to distinguish between these two eﬀects.
We also introduce a control variable which directly captures
part of the reporting problem related to a lack of diligence or
uninformed coding decisions, rather than politico-economic
motives. This is possible if we assume that the quality of cod-
ing is positively related to a donor country’s general level of
bureaucratic quality. Bureaucratic quality can be measured
with the indicator on government eﬀectiveness provided by
the World Bank’s (2009b) World Governance Indicators
(WGI). According to its deﬁnition, this indicator captures
“perceptions on the quality of public services, the quality of
the civil service and the degree of its independence from polit-
ical pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implemen-
tation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to
such policies” (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009, p. 6).
As this variable was only created on a bi-annual basis until
2003, we use linear interpolations from data of neighboring
years to impute missing values.
Finally, we include one project level control variable indicat-
ing whether the recipient country is a member of the group of
Small Island Developing States (SIDS) (UN., 2007). In these
countries, most projects are climate relevant in some way or
the other due to their high vulnerability to climate change.
Therefore, by deﬁnition, there may be less scope for over-
coding.
Details on all variable deﬁnitions and sources are provided
in Appendix C. Unfortunately, many of the explanatory vari-
ables, notably the political variables most important for our
analysis, are only available until the end of 2007. As men-
tioned earlier, the starting year of our analysis is 1995, since
no country used the Rio marker for any earlier year. This leads
to an overall time period covered from 1995 to 2007.
The estimation approach needs to reﬂect the structure of the
data, notably the fact that any given donor carries out a mul-
titude of projects which cannot be considered as fully indepen-
dent from each other. This leads us to adopt a two-level
hierarchical model in which projects are nested in donors.
However, there is some risk that unobserved donor character-
istics might induce bias. We thus test the typical two-level
(random eﬀects) model against a model with donor ﬁxed ef-
fects, using a standard Hausman test. This test consistently re-
jects the random eﬀects model. We therefore proceed with the
ﬁxed eﬀects model here. It should be noted, however, that due
to the large sample size the precision of estimated coeﬃcients
is very high and the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcient estimates
in both models is hardly visible.
CODING ERROR OR STATISTICAL EMBELLISHMENT 2015
Author's personal copy
Apart from projects being nested in donors, there may be
other interdependencies between our observations induced
by the structure of our data. For instance, certain years could
be of particular relevance leading to a general eﬀect on all pro-
jects across all donors. One could imagine that the year 1998
when most donors introduced the Rio coding, should be a
matter in case. Surprisingly, we do not ﬁnd much evidence
for such year speciﬁc eﬀects. They are mostly insigniﬁcant,
so that we eventually decided to leave them out of the ﬁnal
speciﬁcation. Results of other variables remain unaﬀected.
In addition, there could be unknown relationships between
projects in certain sectors or regions which we have not explic-
itly taken into account through any variables in the model.
This suggests using estimation methods robust to serial corre-
lation and heteroskedasticity.
As our dependent variable is binary (reﬂecting the coding
decision) the problem becomes more complicated, however,
since binary response models (logit or probit) are inconsistent
in the presence of heteroscedasticity or unmeasured heteroge-
neity (Greene, 2002, p. 673f). In other words, if we believe that
we need robust estimation, the whole model is incorrectly
speciﬁed in the ﬁrst place. We therefore proceed by presenting
both, a logit estimation under the assumption of homoscedas-
ticity and no autocorrelation, and a linear probability model
to assess what happens if we relax this assumption and use a
robust estimation for our variance-covariance matrix.
As an additional robustness check, we estimated the whole
model at country level, using shares of over-coded projects
as the dependent variable. This considerably reduces the
number of observations and therefore, the precision of the
estimation, and also induces us to drop or average certain pro-
ject-level variables. However, it avoids the problem of
unknown interdependencies of observations at the project le-
vel. Moreover, it is the only speciﬁcation where the Hausman
test suggests RE-estimation, so that time invariant variables
can also be taken into account.
5. POLITICO-ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF
CODING MISMATCH: ECONOMETRIC EVIDENCE
Let us now examine the results of our analysis. Table 2 pre-
sents six regressions. Regressions A–C use the Rio dummy as
the dependent variable and control for mitigation and adapta-
tion, while Regression D and E directly use our dummy for
over-coding. Regressions A, B and D are based on the (robust)
linear probability model, whereas Regressions C and E are lo-
git regressions. Regression A diﬀers from Regression B in that
we drop two of the macroeconomic variables (unemployment
and GDP per capita) which are clearly insigniﬁcant. Finally,
Regression F presents the results of the country level estima-
tion using the annual share of over-coded projects as the
dependent variable.
Regressions A–C which use the donor’s coding decision as
the dependent variable allow us to include our coding of mit-
igation and adaptation to control for the match of coding
decisions with the projects’ actual climate relevance. As our
descriptive statistics have already suggested, instead of a
one-to-one relationship between mitigation and a positive
Rio marker, our mitigation dummy increases the probability
of a positive Rio marker by only about 34–42%. Projects
related to adaptation increase this probability by another 6–
10% (depending on the diﬀerent speciﬁcations). Much of the
overall variance in the dependent variable remains unex-
plained, and we will now see whether some of it is indeed sys-
tematically related to our politico-economic variables.
We obtain the clearest results for our two major political
variables, the share of green parliamentarians and cabinet
composition. The latter is signiﬁcantly negative throughout,
suggesting that the ideological position of government clearly
plays a role for over-coding—with over-coding being less pre-
valent in left-wing governments (Hypothesis 3). This is in line
with our conjecture that, due to their own preferences, these
governments may tend to truly act on climate related issues
rather than to simply rely on over-coding. 9
In most regressions the substantive eﬀect lies between 0.5
and 1 percentage points for a full switch from hegemony
of right parties to hegemony of left parties. If the left–right
dimension only imprecisely captures the governments’ envi-
ronmental preferences, the true eﬀect should be even stronger.
Among the other variables included as more indirect mea-
sures of government preferences, the eﬀect of meteorological
extreme events is also relatively clear: If the donor country is
hit by a meteorological extreme event, over-coding tends to
be reduced by 0.1–0.5 percentage points. This eﬀect is sus-
tained over the following year. In the country level regression
(Regression F) this eﬀect is insigniﬁcant, but similar in size.
For the Kyoto gap, coeﬃcient estimates also have the ex-
pected sign but they are small (as they refer to a change of
the gap by 100%) and signiﬁcant only in regressions without
robust standard errors (Regressions C and E).
When distinguishing donor governments’ preferences from
the preferences of their population to assess the speciﬁc eﬀect
of the latter (Hypothesis 1), our most direct variable is the
share of green parliamentarians. As already mentioned, this
variable appears to be clearly relevant. Our results suggest that
increasing the share of green party representatives in a na-
tional parliament by 1 percentage point leads to a 0.1 percent-
age point increase of projects coded as climate relevant,
irrespective of the projects’ actual relationship to mitigation
or adaptation. The positive coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant in all
but two regressions, but even there, they fall only slightly un-
der the threshold of a 10% signiﬁcance level. These results are
in line with our conjecture that, ceteris paribus, a population’s
ecological preferences, as expressed in the votes at national
elections, lead to higher over-coding.
We do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects for the other two variables
introduced to measure public preferences, that is, unemploy-
ment and the expressed concern about global warming. Gen-
erally, the eﬀect of our macroeconomic variables (including
those introduced as controls) is far less robust than the eﬀect
of many other variables. This seems to be partially related to
their correlation among each other. We therefore drop the
unemployment variable as well as GDP per capita from
Regressions B–F.
Hypothesis 2 on the role of media information in reducing
over-coding is less clearly in line with the empirical evidence.
As expected the coeﬃcients are negative, but it is signiﬁcant
only in 2 out of 6 regressions. Moreover, the substantive eﬀect
is rather small: One hundred more New York Times articles
mentioning climate change in their abstract or introduction
in any given year only reduce over-coding by only 0.05–0.5
percentage points.
Moreover, considering the lag of our information variable,
we ﬁnd that the eﬀect is reversed only one year later. Our inter-
pretation is that information ﬁrst increases the call for truly
climate relevant interventions and the critical scrutiny of gov-
ernment action in this respect. However, after some time, if the
information eﬀort is not sustained, people reduce their eﬀort
of critical policy assessment so that simple statistical embel-
lishment tends to become the governments’ preferred strategy.
All in all, the substantive eﬀect is weak, which may be related
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to the fact that media information on climate-change related
issues is generally rather superﬁcial.
As far as our control variables are concerned, the most sig-
niﬁcant results are obtained for the share of elderly people
(which tends to increase over-coding), the general quality of
bureaucratic services (which tends to decrease over-coding),
and the share of agricultural value added in donor countries
(which equally tends to decrease over-coding). While fully sig-
niﬁcant in only two regressions, there is also some evidence for
the expected stronger coding gap for large projects.
The overall picture clearly shows that politico-economic
variables systematically inﬂuence donors’ coding of aid pro-
jects. While the eﬀects observed are relatively small in magni-
tude, for the most part, they are clearly diﬀerent from zero and
relatively robust across diﬀerent speciﬁcations—at least in
terms of direction and signiﬁcance. Especially the impact of
government ideology and of public environmental preferences
is clearly supported by the data. Media information appears to
have a smaller eﬀect than expected, which may be related to
the relatively superﬁcial coverage of climate policy issues.
Table 2. Estimation resultsa
Regression number (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Regression type FE, linearb FE, linearb FE, logitc FE, linearb FE, logitc RE,lineard
Dependent variable Rio dummy Rio dummy Rio dummy Over-coding Over-coding Share of over-coding
Environmental preferences, donor country population
Green parliamentarians, in% 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0002 0.001
(0.13) (0.13) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.09)
Unemployment, in% 0.0003
(0.76)
Global warming very important 0.002
(0.93)
Information
New York Times 4.63e05 4.56e05 2.58e05 1.36e05 7.89e06 4.07e06
(0.13) (0.14) (0.00) (0.26) (0.00) (0.72)
New York Times, lagged 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 1.13e05 1.66e05 0.0006
(0.18) (0.24) (0.00) (0.77) (0.00) (0.12)
Donor government preferences
Cabinet composition, 1 right–5 left 0.002 0.002 0.0004 0.001 0.0002 0.001
(0.06) (0.02) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) (0.03)
Kyoto gap relative to base year 0.003 0.001 0.007 0.010 0.004 0.005
(0.85) (0.96) (0.02) (0.31) (0.01) (0.51)
Extreme events 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.47)
Extreme events, lagged 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001
(0.05) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.63)
Controls: actual climate relevance
Mitigation 0.416 0.416 0.337
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Adaptation 0.095 0.095 0.064
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
Other controls
GDP growth, in% 0.0005 0.0006 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002
(0.58) (0.50) (0.00) (0.61) (0.00) (0.68)
GDP per capita 1.39e07
(0.85)
Agricultural value added, in% 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.001
(0.77) (0.74) (0.04) (0.09) (0.00) (0.11)
Population 65 and over, in% 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.0002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.71)
Big project 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.03 0.001
(0.21) (0.20) (0.00) (0.13) (0.00)
Government eﬀectiveness 0.025 0.025 0.011 0.009 0.004 0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.60)
SIDS 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.007 0.0004
(0.77) (0.78) (0.46) (0.21) (0.09)
Prob > (Wald) Chi2 or Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 557,278 557,278 557,278 557,278 557,278 259
Number of donors 21 21 21 21 21 20
Number of years 13 13 13 13 13 13
aP-values in parentheses, constants and ﬁxed eﬀects not presented. Coeﬃcients signiﬁcant at the 10% level or above are presented in bold.
bRobust estimation with standard errors clustered by donor.
cMarginal eﬀects, evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables; for dummies, discrete change from 0 to 1.
d Estimation at donor, rather than at project level. At this level, the Hausman test suggests RE estimation. One country observation is lost due to missing
values for the “global warming” variable.
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At the same time, the strong evidence for adaptation related
coding indicates a wide-spread misunderstanding of the cur-
rent Rio marker. Our control for government eﬀectiveness also
suggests that there may be problems of coding diligence at
least in some countries.
All in all, our diﬀerent political-economic models allow us to
explain up to about 15% of the variance in the respective
dependent variables.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Discrepancies between climate coding of aid projects re-
ported to the DAC and a keyword based examination of ac-
tual climate change-relevance have led us to conjecture that
climate coding may be motivated by political factors, at least
to some extent. As we cannot draw from prior theoretical
analysis on politically motivated coding decisions, we derive
our hypotheses based on a conceptual framework related to
the general literature on public choice, the political economy
of aid, and the political economy of environmental policy.
The analysis remains largely exploratory and many interpreta-
tions may lend themselves to further debate.
Nevertheless, the empirical results are generally consistent
with our hypotheses. They are tested using project-level aid
data and country-level political data for 21 DAC donors from
1995 to 2007. Keyword search in the project descriptions of
the AidData database and complementary hand-coding allows
us to assess all projects for their actual climate change-related
content, and to thereby construct the most relevant control
variable.
The econometric model takes into account the hierarchical
structure of the data, whereby projects are nested in donor
countries. We ﬁnd that mitigation, the oﬃcial focus of the
DAC reported climate coding, only adds about one third to
the probability to actually receive the so-called climate related
“Rio marker” by DAC donors. Relevance to adaptation,
which is excluded by the formal deﬁnition of the Rio marker,
roughly adds up to another 10%. The latter may, at least in
part, be due to a misunderstanding of the Rio marker.
In addition to these two variables characterizing the sub-
stance of the project, a number of political variables are sys-
tematically related to the coding decision. In line with the
politico-economic framework, we ﬁnd that general ecological
preferences of the donor country population and the ideolog-
ical preferences of the donor government inﬂuence the coding
decision. While the former leads to stronger over-coding, the
latter leads to reduced over-coding—presumably because in
this case, the government pushed for actual climate policy.
We also ﬁnd some evidence for the impact of information
on climate policy by the media, although this eﬀect is only rel-
atively small and changes from a positive eﬀect of information,
to a negative one (implying more over-coding) in the following
year.
All in all, our results imply that for a given relevance of any
project to climate change mitigation or adaptation, politico-
economic factors signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the statistics reported
to the DAC. What we observe in the data is clearly inconsis-
tent with a simple random error around an otherwise correct
coding of climate relevant aid.
NOTES
1. Lead reduction is needed to employ catalytic converters. It thus
generates twofold environmental beneﬁts by reducing both lead and NOx.
But these beneﬁts do not arise with respect to greenhouse gases. In fact,
CO2 emissions actually increase since the eﬃciency of motors is reduced.
2. For more recent analyses, see for example Fleck and Kilby (2010) and
Berthe´lemy (2006); for a meta-analysis of some of this literature, see
Doucougliagos and Paldam (2008).
3. We use the term “climate aid” as a short hand for climate change-
related aid.
4. The aid activities listed in the AidData database also include
nonproject aid, for example, budget support, other program funding, or
small activities such as feasibility studies (Tierney et al., 2011). These
distinctions do not matter in the context of our analysis. As the vast
majority of activities are traditional aid projects, we interchangeably use
the term “projects” for ease of exposition.
5. “Activities receive a signiﬁcant score (score “1”) where climate change
adaptation was an important, but not principal objective. The score not
targeted (score “0”) means that the activity has been found not to be
targeting signiﬁcantly climate change adaptation.” (OECD-DAC 2009b, p.
1, emphasis added by the authors).
6. While it might be safer to include these categories if one wants to make
sure to cover all possibly climate related projects, we exclude thembecause the
probability that they are truly related to climate change mitigation (without
further mentioning of this relationship) appears to be relatively small.
7. Note that this coding decision has both technical and theoretical
reasons. If noncoded projects were simply omitted, for some countries, we
would not have any variance on the dependent variable any more. Thus
countries like the US would have to be dropped from our analysis. From a
theoretical perspective, we suggest that, when the issue is to demonstrate
climate-friendly activities through aid allocation, the political decision not
to assess the projects is substantially equivalent to coding them as climate
change-irrelevant. Appendix provides information on the share of projects
noncoded by individual donor country.
8. We initially considered to also include a number of well-known
European newspapers such as “Le Monde”, “The Guardian”, “Die Welt”,
and “El Pais”, but the time series are not long enough. Moreover, it turns
out that information provided on climate change is strongly correlated
across these diﬀerent newspapers (for the number of articles per year, we
obtain a correlation coeﬃcient of 88% between the “New York Times”
and “Le Monde”, and of over 95% for the “New York Times” and any of
the three other newspapers.
9. Note that the ﬁrst part of this conjecture cannot be tested with
climate aid data. Government preferences for environmental protection
tend to be positively correlated to government preferences for devel-
opment aid. An environmentally oriented government should thus not
be expected to substitute action against climate change for traditional
development projects, but rather, to carry out additional mitigation
activities (e.g., through emission reduction at home). Indeed, actual
climate aid (as opposed to climate aid related coding) seems to be
relatively unaﬀected by any of the political variables above (Michael-
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